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Abstract
We study the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of one-hop wireless networks by
considering four fundamental wireless network structures: Gaussian wiretap channel,
Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages, Gaussian interference channel
with confidential messages, and Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel. The secrecy
capacity of the canonical Gaussian wiretap channel does not scale with the transmit
power, and hence, the secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel with no helpers
is zero. It has been known that a strictly positive secure d.o.f. can be obtained in
the Gaussian wiretap channel by using a helper which sends structured cooperative
signals. We show that the exact secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel with
a helper is 12 . Our achievable scheme is based on real interference alignment and
cooperative jamming, which renders the message signal and the cooperative jamming
signal separable at the legitimate receiver, but aligns them perfectly at the eavesdropper
preventing any reliable decoding of the message signal. Our converse is based on two
key lemmas. The first lemma quantifies the secrecy penalty by showing that the net
effect of an eavesdropper on the system is that it eliminates one of the independent
channel inputs. The second lemma quantifies the role of a helper by developing a direct
relationship between the cooperative jamming signal of a helper and the message rate.
We extend this result to the case of M helpers, and show that the exact secure d.o.f. in
this case is MM+1 . We then generalize this approach to more general network structures
with multiple messages. We show that the sum secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian broadcast
channel with confidential messages and M helpers is 1, the sum secure d.o.f. of the
two-user interference channel with confidential messages is 23 , the sum secure d.o.f. of
the two-user interference channel with confidential messages and M helpers is 1, and
the sum secure d.o.f. of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel is K(K−1)K(K−1)+1 .
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 09-64632, CCF 09-64645, CCF 10-18185 and CNS 11-
47811.
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1 Introduction
We study secure communications in one-hop wireless networks from an information-theoretic
point of view. Wyner introduced the wiretap channel [1], in which a legitimate transmitter
wishes to send a message to a legitimate receiver secret from the eavesdropper. The capacity-
equivocation region was originally found for the degraded wiretap channel by Wyner [1], then
generalized to the general wiretap channel by Csiszar and Korner [2], and extended to the
Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [3]. Multi-user versions of
the wiretap channel have been studied recently, e.g., broadcast channels with confidential
messages [4,5], multi-receiver wiretap channels [6–8] (see also a survey on extensions of these
to MIMO channels [9]), two-user interference channels with confidential messages [4, 10],
multiple access wiretap channels [11–15], relay eavesdropper channels [16–21], compound
wiretap channels [22, 23]. Since in most multi-user scenarios it is difficult to obtain the
exact secrecy capacity region, achievable secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) at high signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) cases have been studied for several channel structures, such as the K-user
Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages [24, 25], the K-user interference
channel with external eavesdroppers [26], the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper
[27,28], the Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel [29,30], and the wirelessX network [31].
In the Gaussian wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is the difference between the chan-
nel capacities of the transmitter-receiver and the transmitter-eavesdropper pairs. It is well-
known that this difference does not scale with the SNR, and hence the secure d.o.f. of the
Gaussian wiretap channel is zero, indicating a severe penalty due to secrecy in this case.
Fortunately, this does not hold in multi-user scenarios. In a multi-user network, focusing on
a specific transmitter-receiver pair, other (independent) transmitters can be understood as
helpers which can improve the individual secrecy rate of this specific pair by cooperatively
jamming the eavesdropper [11,12,15,32].1 These cooperative jamming signals also limit the
decoding performance of the legitimate receiver. It is also known that if the helper nodes
transmit independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian cooperative jamming signals
in a Gaussian wiretap channel, then the secure d.o.f. is still zero [11, 12, 30, 32]. Such i.i.d.
Gaussian signals, while maximally jam the eavesdropper, also maximally hurt the legitimate
user’s decoding capability. Therefore, we expect that strictly positive secure d.o.f. may be
achieved with some weak jamming signals. Confirming this intuition, [27, 28] achieved posi-
tive secure d.o.f. by using nested lattice codes in a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper.
In this paper, we obtain the exact secure d.o.f. of several Gaussian network structures, in-
cluding the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper, by characterizing this trade-off in the
cooperative jamming signals of the helpers.
1Note that, if reliability was the only concern, then in order to maximize the reliable rate of a given
transmitter-receiver pair, all other independent transmitters must remain silent. However, when secrecy
in addition to reliability is a concern, then independent helpers can improve the secrecy rate of a given
transmitter-receiver pair by transmitting signals [11, 12, 15, 32].
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We start by considering the Gaussian wiretap channel with a single helper, as shown
in Figure 1. In this channel model, secure d.o.f. with i.i.d. Gaussian cooperative signals is
zero [32], and strictly positive secure d.o.f. can be obtained, for instance, by using nested
lattice codes [27, 28]. Considering this model as a special case of other channel models,
we can verify that 1
4
secure d.o.f. can be achieved as a symmetric individual rate on the
two-user interference channel with external eavesdroppers [26] and on the multiple access
wiretap channel [29]. References [33] and [28, Theorem 5.4 on page 126] showed that with
integer lattice codes a secure d.o.f. of 1
2
can be achieved if the channel gains are irrational
algebraic numbers. While such class of channel gains has zero Lebesgue measure, the idea
behind this achievable scheme can be generalized to much larger set of channel gains. The
enabling idea behind this achievable scheme is as follows: If the cooperative jamming signal
from the helper and the message signal from the legitimate user can be aligned in the same
dimension at the eavesdropper, then the secrecy penalty due to the information leakage to
the eavesdropper can be upper bounded by a constant, while the information transmission
rate to the legitimate user can be made to scale with the transmit power. Following this
insight, we propose an achievable scheme based on real interference alignment [34, 35] and
cooperative jamming to achieve 1
2
secure d.o.f. for almost all channel gains. This constitutes
the best known achievable secure d.o.f. for the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper.
The cooperative jamming signal from the helper can be distinguished from the message
signal at the legitimate receiver by properly designing the structure of the signals from
both transmitters; meanwhile, they can be aligned together at the observation space of the
eavesdropper to ensure undecodability of the message signal, hence secrecy (see Figure 7).
Intuitively, the end result of 1
2
secure d.o.f. comes from the facts that the cooperative jamming
signal and the message signal should be of about the same size to align at the eavesdropper,
and they should be separable at the legitimate receiver, who can decode at most a total
of 1 d.o.f. We analyze the rate and equivocation achieved by this scheme by using the
Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in number theory.
For the converse for this channel model, the best known upper bound is 2
3
[28, Theorem
5.3 on page 126] which was obtained by adding virtual nodes to the system and using the
upper bound developed in [36]. Reference [36] developed upper bounds for the secure d.o.f. of
the multiple-antenna compound wiretap channel by exploring the correlation between the
n-letter observations of a group of legitimate receivers and a group of eavesdroppers, instead
of working with single-letter expressions. Our converse works with n-letter observations
as well. Our converse has two key steps. First, we upper bound the secrecy rate by the
difference of the sum of differential entropies of the channel inputs of the legitimate receiver
and the helper and the differential entropy of the eavesdropper’s observation. This shows
that, the secrecy penalty due to the eavesdropper’s observation is tantamount to eliminating
one of the independent channel inputs. As a result, the final upper bound involves only the
differential entropy of the channel input of the independent helper. In the second step, we
3
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Figure 1: Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper.
develop a relationship between the cooperative jamming signal from the independent helper
and the message rate. The goal of the cooperative jamming signal is to further confuse the
eavesdropper. However, the cooperative jamming signal appears in the channel output of
the legitimate user also. Intuitively, if the legitimate user is to reliably decode the message
signal which is mixed with the cooperative jamming signal, there must exist a constraint on
the cooperative jamming signal. Our second step identifies this constraint by developing an
upper bound on the differential entropy of the cooperative jamming signal in terms of the
message rate. These two steps give us an upper bound of 1
2
secure d.o.f. for the Gaussian
wiretap channel with a helper, which matches our achievable lower bound. This concludes
that the exact secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper is 1
2
for almost all
channel gains.
We then generalize our result to the case of M independent helpers. We show that the
exact secure d.o.f. in this case is M
M+1
. Our achievability extends our original achievability for
the one-helper case in the following manner: The transmitter sends its message by employing
M independent sub-messages, and the M helpers send independent cooperative jamming
signals. Each cooperative jamming signal is aligned with one of the M sub-messages at the
eavesdropper to ensure secrecy (see Figure 8). Therefore, each sub-message is protected by
one of theM helpers. Our converse is an extension of the converse in the one-helper case. In
particular, we upper bound the secrecy rate by the difference of the sum of the differential
entropies of all of the channel inputs and the differential entropy of the eavesdropper’s
observation. The secrecy penalty due to the eavesdropper’s observation eliminates one of the
channel inputs, which we choose as the legitimate user’s channel input. We then utilize the
relationship we developed between the differential entropy of each of the cooperative jamming
signals and the message rate. The upper bound so developed matches the achievability lower
bound, giving the exact secure d.o.f. for the M-helper case.
As an important extension of the single-message one-helper problem, we consider the
broadcast channel with confidential messages and one-helper, where a transmitter wishes to
send two messages securely to two users on a broadcast channel while keeping each message
secure from the unintended receiver. Without a helper, the sum secure d.o.f. of this channel
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model is zero. We show that with one helper, the exact sum secure d.o.f. is 1. The sum secure
d.o.f. remains the same as more helpers are added. The achievability for the one-helper case
is as follows: The transmitter sends the channel input by putting two messages on different
rational dimensions. Meanwhile, the cooperative jamming signal from the helper is designed
in such a way that it aligns with the unintended message, but leaves the intended message
intact, at each receiver (see Figure 9). The converse for this case follows from the converse
without any secrecy constraints for the Gaussian broadcast channel, which is 1.
Cooperative jamming based achievable schemes are intuitive for the independent-helper
problems due to the fact that the helpers do not have messages of their own. Such schemes
can be extended to multiple-transmitter (with independent messages) settings, such as, in-
terference channels with confidential messages and multiple access wiretap channel, etc. All
previous works extended this approach in the following way: Each transmitter simply sends
one message signal, and the message signals from all of the transmitters are aligned together
at the eavesdropper. Due to the mixture of the message signals, the eavesdropper is confused
regarding any one of the message signals, and a positive secure d.o.f. is achievable. However,
this approach is sub-optimal. To achieve optimal secure d.o.f., we need to design the struc-
ture of the channel inputs more carefully. We propose the following transmission structure:
Besides the message carrying signal, each transmitter also sends a cooperative jamming sig-
nal. The exact number and the structure of the message signals and the cooperative jamming
signals depend on the specific network structure.
For the two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, previously
known lower bounds for the sum secure d.o.f. are 1
3
[31] and 0 [24], which come from the
general results for the K-user case: K−1
2K−1
[31] and K−2
2K−2
[24]. The individual secure d.o.f. of
1
2
achieved in [33] and [28, Theorem 5.4 on page 126] in the context of the wiretap channel
with a helper (for the class of algebraic irrational channel gains) can also be understood as a
lower bound for the sum secure d.o.f. for the two-user interference channel with confidential
messages. We show that, by using interference alignment and cooperative jamming at both
transmitters, we can achieve a sum secure d.o.f. of 2
3
for almost all channel gains, which is
better than all previously known achievable secure d.o.f. We design an achievable scheme in
which each transmitter sends a mixed signal containing the message signal and a cooperative
jamming signal. These two components have the same signaling structure, and are separable
at the intended receiver. Furthermore, the cooperative jamming signal is perfectly aligned
with the message signal from the other transmitter (see Figure 10). Our converse starts
with considering transmitter 2 as a helper for transmitter-receiver pair 1. In contrast to the
single-message case, since transmitter 2 also intends to deliver a message W2 to receiver 2, in
the second step, we treat transmitter 1 as the helper for the transmitter-receiver pair 2 and
upper bound the differential entropy of its channel input by using its relationship with the
message rate of W2. The converse matches the achievability lower bound, giving the exact
secure d.o.f. for the two-user interference channel with confidential messages as 2
3
.
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We then generalize this result to the case with one helper, i.e., two two-user Gaussian
interference channel with confidential messages and one helper. We show that a sum secure
d.o.f. of 1 is achievable. The structure of the channel inputs in the corresponding achievable
scheme is simpler than in the cases of previous channel models. Each transmitter sends
a signal carrying its message. With probability one, these two signals are not in the same
rational dimension at the receivers. On the other hand, the cooperative jamming signal from
the helper can be aligned with the unintended message at each receiver while leaving the
intended message intact (see Figure 11). The converse for this case follows from the converse
without any secrecy constraints for the two-user Gaussian interference channel [37], which
is 1. This concludes that the exact sum secure d.o.f. of the two-user Gaussian interference
channel with confidential messages and one helper is 1. Since utilizing one helper is sufficient
to achieve the upper bound, the sum secure d.o.f. remains the same for arbitrary M helpers.
For the K-user multiple access wiretap channel, the best known lower bound for the sum
secure d.o.f. is K−1
K
[29] which gives 1
2
for K = 2. In addition, for K = 2, the individual
secure d.o.f. of 1
2
achieved in [33] and [28, Theorem 5.4 on page 126] in the context of the
wiretap channel with a helper (for the class of algebraic irrational channel gains) can also
be understood as a lower bound for the sum secure d.o.f. for the two-user multiple access
wiretap channel. We show that, by using interference alignment and cooperative jamming
at all transmitters simultaneously, we can achieve a sum secure d.o.f. of K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
for the
K-user multiple access wiretap channel, for almost all channel gains, which is better than
all previously known achievable secure d.o.f. In particular, for K = 2, our achievable scheme
gives a sum secure d.o.f. of 2
3
. In order to obtain this sum secure d.o.f., we need a more
detailed structure for each channel input. Each transmitter sends a mixed signal containing
the message signal and a cooperative jamming signal. Specifically, each transmitter divides
its own message into K − 1 sub-messages each of which having the same structure as the
cooperative jamming signal. By such a scheme, the totalK cooperative jamming signals from
the K transmitters span the whole space at the eavesdropper’s observation, in order to hide
each one of the message signals from the eavesdropper. On the other hand, to maximize
the sum secrecy d.o.f., the cooperative jamming signals from all of the transmitters are
aligned in the same dimension at the legitimate receiver to occupy the smallest space (see
Figure 12). Our converse is a generalization of our converse used in earlier channel model.
We first show that the sum secrecy rate is upper bounded by the sum of differential entropies
of all channel inputs except the one eliminated by the eavesdropper’s observation. Then,
we consider each channel input as the jamming signal for all other transmitters and upper
bound its differential entropy by using its relationship with the sum rate of the messages
belonging to all other transmitters. This gives us a matching converse and shows that the
exact sum secure d.o.f. for this channel model is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
.
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2 System Model and Definitions
In this paper, we consider four fundamental channel models: wiretap channel with helpers,
broadcast channel with confidential messages and helpers, two-user interference channel with
confidential messages and helpers, and multiple access wiretap channel. In this section, we
give the channel models and relevant definitions. All the channels are additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channels. All the channel gains are time-invariant, and independently drawn
from continuous distributions.
2.1 Wiretap Channel with Helpers
The Gaussian wiretap channel with helpers (see Figure 2) is defined by,
Y1 = h1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
hjXj +N1 (1)
Y2 = g1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
gjXj +N2 (2)
where Y1 is the channel output of the legitimate receiver, Y2 is the channel output of the
eavesdropper, X1 is the channel input of the legitimate transmitter, Xi, for i = 2, . . . ,M+1,
are the channel inputs of the M helpers, hi is the channel gain of the ith transmitter to the
legitimate receiver, gi is the channel gain of the ith transmitter to the eavesdropper, and
N1 and N2 are two independent zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variables. All
channel inputs satisfy average power constraints, E [X2i ] ≤ P , for i = 1, . . . ,M + 1.
Transmitter 1 intends to send a message W , uniformly chosen from a set W, to the
legitimate receiver (receiver 1). The rate of the message is R
△
= 1
n
log |W|, where n is the
number of channel uses. Transmitter 1 uses a stochastic function f :W → X1 to encode the
message, where X1
△
= Xn1 is the n-length channel input.
2 The legitimate receiver decodes
the message as Wˆ based on its observation Y1. A secrecy rate R is said to be achievable
if for any ǫ > 0 there exists an n-length code such that receiver 1 can decode this message
reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than ǫ,
Pr
[
W 6= Wˆ
]
≤ ǫ (3)
and the message is kept information-theoretically secure against the eavesdropper,
1
n
H(W |Y2) ≥
1
n
H(W )− ǫ (4)
i.e., that the uncertainty of the message W , given the observation Y2 of the eavesdropper,
2We use boldface letters to denote n-length vector signals, e.g., X1
△
= Xn
1
, Y1
△
= Y n
1
, Y2
△
= Y n
2
, etc.
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Figure 2: Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers.
is almost equal to the entropy of the message. The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates
is the secrecy capacity Cs and the secure d.o.f., Ds, is defined as
Ds
△
= lim
P→∞
Cs
1
2
logP
(5)
Note that Ds ≤ 1 is an upper bound. To avoid trivial cases, we assume that h1 6= 0 and
g1 6= 0. Without the independent helpers, i.e., M = 0, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
wiretap channel is known [3]
Cs =
1
2
log
(
1 + h21P
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + g21P
)
(6)
and from (5) the secure d.o.f. is zero. Therefore, we assume M ≥ 1. If there exists a j
(j = 2, . . . ,M +1) such that hj = 0 and gj 6= 0, then a lower bound of 1 secure d.o.f. can be
obtained for this channel by letting this helper jam the eavesdropper by i.i.d. Gaussian noise
of power P and keeping all other helpers silent. This lower bound matches the upper bound,
giving the secure d.o.f. On the other hand, if there exists a j (j = 2, . . . ,M + 1) such that
hj 6= 0 and gj = 0, then this helper can be removed from the channel model without affecting
the secure d.o.f. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, for the case of Gaussian wiretap channel
with M helpers, we assume that M ≥ 1 and hj 6= 0 and gj 6= 0 for all j = 1, · · · ,M + 1.
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2.2 Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages and Helpers
The Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages and helpers (see Figure 3 for
one helper) is defined by,
Y1 = h1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
hjXj +N1 (7)
Y2 = g1X1 +
M+1∑
j=2
gjXj +N2 (8)
In this model, transmitter 1 has two independent messages,W1 andW2, intended for receivers
1 and 2, respectively. MessagesW1 andW2 are independently and uniformly chosen from sets
W1 andW2, respectively. The rates of the messages are R1
△
= 1
n
log |W1| and R2
△
= 1
n
log |W2|.
Transmitter 1 uses a stochastic function f : W1 ×W2 → X1 to encode the messages. The
messages are said to be confidential if only the intended receiver can decode each message,
i.e., each receiver is an eavesdropper for the other. Transmitters 2, 3, · · · ,M + 1 are the
independent helpers. Similar to (3) and (4), we define the reliability and secrecy of the
messages as,
Pr[W1 6= Wˆ1] ≤ ǫ (9)
Pr[W2 6= Wˆ2] ≤ ǫ (10)
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥
1
n
H(W1)− ǫ (11)
1
n
H(W2|Y1) ≥
1
n
H(W2)− ǫ (12)
The sum secure d.o.f. for this channel model is defined as
Ds,Σ
△
= lim
P→∞
sup
R1 +R2
1
2
logP
(13)
where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R1, R2).
2.3 Interference Channel with Confidential Messages and Helpers
The two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages and helpers (see Fig-
ure 4) is defined by,
Y1 = h1,1X1 + h2,1X2 +
M+2∑
j=3
hj,1Xj +N1 (14)
Y2 = h1,2X1 + h2,2X2 +
M+2∑
j=3
hj,2Xj +N2 (15)
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Figure 3: Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages and M = 1 helper.
where X1, X2, · · · , XM+2, N1 and N2 are mutually independent.
One special, but important, case is the two-user Gaussian interference channel with
confidential messages, i.e., M = 0, which is shown in Figure 5 and defined by,
Y1 = h1,1X1 + h2,1X2 +N1 (16)
Y2 = h1,2X1 + h2,2X2 +N2 (17)
In the two-user interference channel with confidential messages, each transmitter wishes
to send a confidential message to its own receiver. Transmitter 1 has message W1 uniformly
chosen from set W1. The rate of the message is R1
△
= 1
n
log |W1|. Transmitter 1 uses a
stochastic function f1 : W1 → X1 to encode the message. Similarly, transmitter 2 has
message W2 (independent of W1) uniformly chosen from set W2. The rate of the message
is R2
△
= 1
n
log |W2|. Transmitter 2 uses a stochastic function f2 : W2 → X2 to encode the
message. The messages are said to be confidential if only the intended receiver can decode
each message, i.e., each receiver is an eavesdropper for the other. Transmitters 2, 3, · · · ,M+1
are the independent helpers. Similar to (3) and (4), we define the reliability and secrecy of
the messages as,
Pr[W1 6= Wˆ1] ≤ ǫ (18)
Pr[W2 6= Wˆ2] ≤ ǫ (19)
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥
1
n
H(W1)− ǫ (20)
1
n
H(W2|Y1) ≥
1
n
H(W2)− ǫ (21)
The sum secure d.o.f. for this channel model is defined as
Ds,Σ
△
= lim
P→∞
sup
R1 +R2
1
2
logP
(22)
10
h2,1
W2Wˆ1
W1W2
W1
X2
Y1
Y2 Wˆ2
h1,1
h1,2
X3
XM+2
X4
N1
N2
h2,2
X1
Figure 4: Two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages andM helpers.
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Figure 5: Two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages.
where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R1, R2).
2.4 Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
The K-user Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel (see Figure 6) is defined by,
Y1 =
K∑
i=1
hjXj +N1 (23)
Y2 =
K∑
i=1
gjXj +N2 (24)
In this channel model, each transmitter i has a message Wi intended for the legitimate
receiver whose channel output is Y1. All of the messages are independent. Message Wi is
uniformly chosen from set Wi. The rate of message i is Ri
△
= 1
n
log |Wi|. Transmitter i uses
a stochastic function fi :Wi → Xi to encode its message. All of the messages are needed to
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Figure 6: K-user multiple access wiretap channel.
be kept secret from the eavesdropper, whose channel output is Y2.
Similar to (3), the reliability of the messages is defined by
Pr
[
(W1, · · · ,WK) 6= (Wˆ1, · · · , WˆK)
]
≤ ǫ (25)
and similar to (4) the secrecy constraint (for the entire message set) is defined as
1
n
H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK |Y2) ≥
1
n
H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK)− ǫ (26)
Note that this definition implies the secrecy for any subset of the messages, including indi-
vidual messages, i.e.,
1
n
H(WS|Y2) =
1
n
H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK |Y2)−
1
n
H(WSc|Y2,WS) (27)
≥
1
n
H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK |Y2)−
1
n
H(WSc|WS) (28)
≥
1
n
H(W1,W2, · · · ,WK)− ǫ−
1
n
H(WSc|WS) (29)
≥
1
n
H(WS)− ǫ (30)
for any S ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , K}. The sum secure d.o.f. for this channel model is defined as
Ds,Σ
△
= lim
P→∞
sup
∑K
i=1Ri
1
2
logP
(31)
where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate tuples (R1, · · · , RK).
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3 General Converse Results
In this section, we give two lemmas that will be used in the converse proofs in later sections.
3.1 Secrecy Penalty
Consider the channel model formulated in Section 2.1, where transmitter 1 wishes to have
secure communication with receiver 1, in the presence of an eavesdropper (receiver 2) andM
helpers (transmitters 2 through M + 1). We propose a general upper bound for the secrecy
rate between transmitter 1 and receiver 1 by working with n-letter signals, and introducing
new mutually independent Gaussian random variables {N˜i}
M
i=2 which are zero-mean and of
variance σ˜2i where σ˜
2
i < min(1/h
2
i , 1/g
2
i ), and are independent of all other random variables.
Each vector N˜i is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜i.
In the following lemma, we give a general upper bound for the secrecy rate. This lemma
states that the secrecy rate of the legitimate pair is upper bounded by the difference of
the sum of differential entropies of all channel inputs (perturbed by small noise) and the
differential entropy of the eavesdropper’s observation; see (32). This upper bound can further
be interpreted as follows: If we consider the eavesdropper’s observation as the secrecy penalty,
then the secrecy penalty is tantamount to the elimination of one of the channel inputs in
the system; see (33).
Lemma 1 The secrecy rate of the legitimate pair is upper bounded as
nR ≤
M+1∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Y2) + nc (32)
≤
M+1∑
i=1,i 6=j
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (33)
where X˜i = Xi+N˜i for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M+1, and N˜i is an i.i.d. sequence (in time) of random
variables N˜i which are independent Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and variance
σ˜2i with σ˜
2
i < min(1/h
2
i , 1/g
2
i ). In addition, c and c
′ are constants which do not depend on
P , and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M + 1} could be arbitrary.
Proof: We use notation ci, for i ≥ 1, to denote constants which are independent of the
power P . We start as follows:
nR = H(W ) = H(W |Y1) + I(W ;Y1) (34)
≤ I(W ;Y1) + nc1 (35)
≤ I(W ;Y1)− I(W ;Y2) + nc2 (36)
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where we used Fano’s inequality and the secrecy constraint in (4). By providing Y2 to
receiver 1, we further upper bound nR as
nR ≤ I(W ;Y1,Y2)− I(W ;Y2) + nc2 (37)
= I(W ;Y1|Y2) + nc2 (38)
= h(Y1|Y2)− h(Y1|Y2,W ) + nc2 (39)
≤ h(Y1|Y2) + nc3 (40)
where (40) is due to
h(Y1|Y2,W ) ≥ h(Y1|X1,X2, · · · ,XM+1,Y2,W ) (41)
= h(N1|X1,X2, · · · ,XM+1,Y2,W ) (42)
= h(N1) (43)
=
n
2
log 2πe (44)
which is independent of P .
In the next step, we introduce random variables X˜i which are noisy versions of the channel
inputs X˜i = Xi + N˜i for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M + 1. Thus, starting from (40),
nR ≤ h(Y1|Y2) + nc3 (45)
= h(Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc3 (46)
= h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1|Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc3 (47)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1|Y1,Y2,X1,X2, · · · ,XM+1)
− h(Y2) + nc3 (48)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1,Y1,Y2)− h(N˜1, N˜2, · · · , N˜M+1|Y1,Y2,X1,X2, · · · ,XM+1)
− h(Y2) + nc3 (49)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1,Y1,Y2)− h(N˜1, N˜2, · · · , N˜M+1)− h(Y2) + nc3 (50)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1,Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc4 (51)
= h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1) + h(Y1,Y2|X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1)− h(Y2) + nc4 (52)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1)− h(Y2) + nc5 (53)
=
M+1∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Y2) + nc5 (54)
where (53) is due to h(Y1,Y2|X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1) ≤ nc6. The intuition behind this is that,
given all (slightly noisy versions of) the channel inputs, (at high SNR) the channel outputs
14
can be reconstructed. To show this formally, we have
h(Y1,Y2|X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1)
≤ h(Y1|X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1) + h(Y2|X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1) (55)
= h
(
M+1∑
i=1
hi(X˜i − N˜i) +N1
∣∣∣∣∣X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1
)
+ h
(
M+1∑
i=1
gi(X˜i − N˜i) +N2
∣∣∣∣∣X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1
)
(56)
= h
(
−
M+1∑
i=1
hiN˜i +N1
∣∣∣∣∣X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1
)
+ h
(
−
M+1∑
i=1
giN˜i +N2
∣∣∣∣∣X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜M+1
)
(57)
≤ h
(
−
M+1∑
i=1
hiN˜i +N1
)
+ h
(
−
M+1∑
i=1
giN˜i +N2
)
(58)
△
= nc6 (59)
which completes the proof of (32).
Finally, we show (33). To this end, fixing a j, which could be arbitrary, we express Y2
in a stochastically equivalent form Y˜2, i.e.,
Y2 = gjXj +
M+1∑
i=1,i 6=j
giXi +N2 (60)
Y˜2 = gjX˜j +
M+1∑
i=1,i 6=j
giXi +N
′
2 (61)
have the same distribution, where N′2 is an i.i.d. sequence of a random variable N
′
2 which is
Gaussian with zero-mean and variance (1 − g2j σ˜
2
j ), and is independent of all other random
variables. Then, we have
h(Y2) = h(Y˜2) (62)
= h
(
gjX˜j +
M+1∑
i=1,i 6=j
giXi +N
′
2
)
(63)
≥ h
(
gjX˜j
)
(64)
= n log |gj|+ h(X˜j) (65)
where (64) is due to the differential entropy version of [38, Problem 2.14]. Substituting this
into (32) gives us (33). 
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3.2 Role of a Helper
Intuitively, a cooperative jamming signal from a helper may potentially increase the secrecy
of the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair by creating extra equivocation at the eavesdrop-
per. However, if the helper creates too much equivocation, it may also hurt the decoding
performance of the legitimate receiver. Since the legitimate receiver needs to decode message
W by observing Y1, there must exist a constraint on the cooperative jamming signal of the
helper. To this end, we develop a constraint on the differential entropy of (the noisy version
of) the cooperative jamming signal of any given helper, helper j in (66), in terms of the dif-
ferential entropy of the legitimate user’s channel output and the message rate H(W ), in the
following lemma. The inequality in this lemma, (66), can alternatively be interpreted as an
upper bound on the message rate, i.e., on H(W ), in terms of the difference of the differential
entropies of the channel output of the legitimate receiver and the channel input of the jth
helper; in particular, the higher the differential entropy of the cooperative jamming signal
the lower this upper bound will be. This motivates not using i.i.d. Gaussian cooperative
jamming signals which have the highest differential entropy.
Finally, we note as an aside that, since this upper bound is derived based on the reliability
of the legitimate user’s decoding (not involving any secrecy constraints), it can be used in
d.o.f. calculations in settings not involving secrecy. We show an application of this lemma
in a non-secrecy context by developing an alternative proof for the multiplexing gain of the
K-user Gaussian interference channel, which was originally proved in [37], in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 For reliable decoding at the legitimate receiver, the differential entropy of the
input signal of helper j, Xj, must satisfy
h(Xj + N˜) ≤ h(Y1)−H(W ) + nc (66)
where c is a constant which does not depend on P , and N˜ is a new Gaussian noise indepen-
dent of all other random variables with σ2
N˜
< 1
h2j
, and N˜ is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜ .
Proof: To reliably decode the message at the legitimate receiver, we must have
nR = H(W ) ≤ I(X1;Y1) (67)
= h(Y1)− h(Y1|X1) (68)
= h(Y1)− h
(
M+1∑
i=2
hiXi +N1
)
(69)
≤ h(Y1)− h (hjXj +N1) (70)
≤ h(Y1)− h
(
hjXj + hjN˜
)
(71)
= h(Y1)− h
(
Xj + N˜
)
+ nc (72)
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where (70) and (71) are due to the differential entropy version of [38, Problem 2.14]. In going
from (70) to (71), we also used the infinite divisibility of Gaussian distribution and expressed
N1 in its stochastically equivalent form as N1 = hjN˜+N
′ where N′ is an i.i.d. sequence of
random variable N ′ which is Gaussian with zero-mean and appropriate variance, and which
is independent of all other random variables. 
Note that, although we develop the inequality in (66) for the message of transmitter-
receiver pair 1, this result also holds for the message of any transmitter-receiver pair in a
multiple-message setting provided that the zero-mean Gaussian noise N˜ has an appropriately
small variance.
4 Wiretap Channel with One Helper
In this section, we consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper as formulated in
Section 2.1 for the case M = 1. In this section, we will show that the secure d.o.f. is 1
2
for almost all channel gains as stated in the following theorem. The converse follows from
the general secrecy penalty upper bound in Section 3.1 and the cooperative jamming signal
upper bound in Section 3.2. The achievability is based on cooperative jamming with discrete
signaling and real interference alignment.
Theorem 1 The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper is 1
2
with
probability one.
4.1 Converse
We start with (33) of Lemma 1 with M = 1 and by choosing j = 1,
nR ≤
M+1∑
i=1,i 6=j
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (73)
= h(X˜2) + nc
′ (74)
≤ h(Y1)−H(W ) + nc7 (75)
≤
n
2
logP −H(W ) + nc8 (76)
where (75) is due to Lemma 2. By noting H(W ) = nR and using (5), (76) implies that
Ds ≤
1
2
(77)
which concludes the converse part of the theorem.
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4.2 Achievable Scheme
To show the achievability by interference alignment, we slightly change the notation. Let
X¯1
△
= g1X1, X¯2
△
= g2X2, α
△
= h1/g1, and β
△
= h2/g2. Then, the channel model becomes
Y1 = αX¯1 + βX¯2 +N1 (78)
Y2 = X¯1 + X¯2 +N2 (79)
Here X¯1 is the input signal carrying the message W of the legitimate transmitter and X¯2 is
the cooperative jamming signal from the helper. Our goal is to properly design X¯1 and X¯2
such that they are distinguishable at the legitimate receiver, meanwhile they align together
at the eavesdropper. To prevent decoding of the message signal at the eavesdropper, we
need to make sure that the cooperative jamming signal occupies the same dimensions as
the message signal at the eavesdropper; on the other hand, we need to make sure that the
legitimate receiver is able to decode X¯2, which in fact, is not useful. Intuitively, secrecy
penalty is almost half of the signal space, and we should be able to have a secure d.o.f. of
1
2
. This is illustrated in Figure 7, and proved formally in the sequel.
We choose both of the input symbols X¯1 and X¯2 independent and uniformly distributed
over the same PAM constellation
C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q + 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (80)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to normalize the transmission
power, and is also the minimum distance between the points belonging to C(a,Q).
Since X¯2 is an i.i.d. sequence and is independent of X¯1, the following secrecy rate is
always achievable [1]
Cs ≥ I(X¯1; Y1)− I(X¯1; Y2) (81)
In order to show that Ds ≥
1
2
, it suffices to prove that this lower bound provides 1
2
secure
d.o.f. To this end, we need to find a lower bound for I(X¯1; Y1) and an upper bound for
I(X¯1; Y2). It is clear that
H(X¯1) = H(X¯2) = log |C(a,Q)| = log(2Q+ 1) (82)
Also, note that, besides the additive Gaussian noise, the observation at receiver 1 is a linear
combination of X¯1 and X¯2, i.e.,
Y1 −N1 = αX¯1 + βX¯2 (83)
where α and β are rationally independent real numbers3 with probability 1.
3 a1, a2, . . . , aL are rationally independent if whenever q1, q2, . . . , qL are rational numbers then
∑L
i=1
qiai =
0 implies qi = 0 for all i.
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Figure 7: Illustration of interference alignment for the Gaussian wiretap channel with one
helper.
The space observed at receiver 1 consists of (2Q + 1)2 signal points. By using the
Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in number theory, references
[34,35] bounded the minimum distance dmin between the points in receiver 1’s constellation
as follows: For any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ such that
dmin ≥
kδa
Q1+δ
(84)
for almost all rationally independent {α, β}, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Then,
we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM scheme by considering
the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1 as follows,
Pr
[
X¯1 6= Xˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8Q2(1+δ)
)
(85)
where Xˆ1 is the estimate for X¯1 obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation
based on observation Y1. For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(2+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where γ
is a constant independent of P , then
Pr
[
X¯1 6= Xˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P
8Q2(1+δ)+2
)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
8
)
(86)
and we can have Pr
[
X¯1 6= Xˆ1
]
→ 0 as P → ∞. To satisfy the power constraint at the
transmitters, we can simply choose γ ≤ min(|g1|, |g2|). By Fano’s inequality and the Markov
chain X¯1 → Y1 → Xˆ1, we know that
H(X¯1|Y1) ≤ H(X¯1|Xˆ1) (87)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
8
)
log(2Q+ 1) (88)
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which means that
I(X¯1; Y1) = H(X¯1)−H(X¯1|Y1) (89)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
8
)]
log(2Q+ 1)− 1 (90)
On the other hand,
I(X¯1; Y2) ≤ I(X¯1; X¯1 + X¯2) (91)
= H(X¯1 + X¯2)−H(X¯2|X¯1) (92)
= H(X¯1 + X¯2)−H(X¯2) (93)
≤ log(4Q+ 1)− log(2Q+ 1) (94)
≤ log
4Q+ 1
2Q+ 1
(95)
≤ 1 (96)
where (94) is due to the fact that entropy of the sum X¯1 + X¯2 is maximized by the uniform
distribution which takes values over a set of cardinality 4Q+ 1.
Combining (90) and (96), we have
Cs ≥ I(X¯1; Y1)− I(X¯1; Y2) (97)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
8
)]
log(2Q+ 1)− 2 (98)
=
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
8
)]
log
(
2P
1−δ
2(2+δ) + 1
)
− 2 (99)
=
1− δ
(2 + δ)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (100)
where the o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily small, then we can achieve
1
2
secure d.o.f., which concludes the achievability part of the theorem.
5 Wiretap Channel with M Helpers
In this section, we consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers as formulated in
Section 2.1 for general M > 1. In this section, we will show that the secure d.o.f. is M
M+1
for
almost all channel gains as stated in the following theorem. This shows that even though the
helpers are independent, the secure d.o.f. increases monotonically with the number of helpers
M . The converse follows from the general secrecy penalty upper bound in Section 3.1 and
the cooperative jamming signal upper bound in Section 3.2. The achievability is based on
cooperative jamming of M helpers with discrete signaling and real interference alignment.
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Theorem 2 The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers is M
M+1
with
probability one.
5.1 Converse
We again start with (33) of Lemma 1 with the selection of j = 1
nR ≤
M+1∑
i=1,i 6=j
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (101)
=
M+1∑
i=2
h(X˜i) + nc
′ (102)
≤M [h(Y1)−H(W )] + nc9 (103)
where (103) is due to Lemma 2 for each jamming signal X˜i, i = 2, 3, · · · ,M + 1. By noting
H(W ) = nR, (103) implies that
(M + 1)nR ≤Mh(Y1) + nc9 (104)
≤M
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc10 (105)
which further implies from (5) that
Ds ≤
M
M + 1
(106)
which concludes the converse part of the theorem.
5.2 Achievable Scheme
Let {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1, U2, U3, · · · , UM+1} be mutually independent discrete random vari-
ables, each of which uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q), where
a and Q will be specified later. We choose the input signal of the legitimate transmitter as
X1 =
M+1∑
k=2
gk
g1hk
Vk (107)
and the input signal of the jth helper, j = 2, 3, · · · ,M + 1, as
Xj =
1
hj
Uj (108)
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Then, the observations of the receivers are
Y1 =
M+1∑
k=2
h1gk
g1hk
Vk +
(
M+1∑
j=2
Uj
)
+N1 (109)
Y2 =
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(
Vk + Uk
)
+N2 (110)
The intuition here is as follows. We use M independent sub-signals Vk, k = 2, 3, · · · ,M +1,
to represent the original message W . The input signal X1 is a linear combination of Vks.
To cooperatively jam the eavesdropper, each helper k aligns the cooperative jamming signal
Uk in the same dimension as the sub-signal Vk at the eavesdropper. At the legitimate
receiver, all of the cooperative jamming signals Uks are well-aligned such that they occupy
a small portion of the signal space. Since, with probability one,
{
1, h1g2
g1h2
, h1g3
g1h3
, · · · , h1gM+1
g1hM+1
}
are rationally independent, the signals
{
V2, V3, · · · , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=2 Uj
}
can be distinguished
by the legitimate receiver. As an example, the case of M = 2 is shown in Figure 8.
Since, for each j 6= 1, Xj is an i.i.d. sequence and independent ofX1, the following secrecy
rate is achievable [1]
Cs ≥ I(X1; Y1)− I(X1; Y2) (111)
Now, we first bound the probability of decoding error. Note that the space observed at
receiver 1 consists of (2Q+1)M(2MQ+1) points inM+1 dimensions, and the sub-signal in
each dimension is drawn from a constellation of C(a,MQ). Here, we use the property that
C(a,Q) ⊂ C(a,MQ). By using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approxi-
mation in number theory, we can bound the minimum distance dmin between the points in
receiver 1’s space as follows: For any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ such that
dmin ≥
kδa
(MQ)M+δ
(112)
for almost all rationally independent
{
1, h1g2
g1h2
, h1g3
g1h3
, · · · , h1gM+1
g1hM+1
}
, except for a set of Lebesgue
measure zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM
scheme by considering the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1,
Pr
[
X1 6= Xˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8(MQ)2(M+δ)
)
(113)
where Xˆ1 is the estimate of X1 by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on
observation Y1. For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where γ is a
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Figure 8: Illustration of interference alignment for the Gaussian wiretap channel with M
helpers. Here, M = 2.
constant independent of P , then
Pr
[
X1 6= Xˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
k2δγ
2M2P
8(MQ)2(M+δ)+2
)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2M2P δ
8M2(M+1+δ)
)
(114)
and we can have Pr
[
X1 6= Xˆ1
]
→ 0 as P → ∞. To satisfy the power constraint at the
transmitters, we can simply choose γ ≤ min([
∑M+1
k=2 (
gk
g1hk
)2]−1/2, |h2|, |h3|, · · · , |hM+1|). By
Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain X1 → Y1 → Xˆ1, we know that
H(X1|Y1) ≤ H(X1|Xˆ1) (115)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−
k2δγ
2M2P δ
8M2(M+1+δ)
)
log(2Q+ 1)M (116)
which means that
I(X1; Y1) = H(X1)−H(X1|Y1) (117)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2M2P δ
8M2(M+1+δ)
)]
log(2Q + 1)M − 1 (118)
On the other hand,
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I(X1; Y2) ≤ I
(
X1;
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
)
(119)
= H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
)
−H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
∣∣∣X1
)
(120)
= H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk)
)
−H
(
M+1∑
k=2
gk
hk
Uk
)
(121)
≤ log(4Q+ 1)M − log(2Q+ 1)M (122)
≤M log
4Q+ 1
2Q+ 1
(123)
≤M (124)
where (122) is due to the fact that entropy of the sum
∑M+1
k=2
gk
hk
(Vk + Uk) is maximized by
the uniform distribution which takes values over a set of cardinality (4Q+ 1)M .
Combining (118) and (124), we have
Cs ≥ I(X1; Y1)− I(X1; Y2) (125)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2M2P δ
8M2(M+1+δ)
)]
log(2Q+ 1)M − (M + 1) (126)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2M2P δ
8M2(M+1+δ)
)]
log(2P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) + 1)M − (M + 1) (127)
=
M(1− δ)
(M + 1 + δ)
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (128)
where o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily small, then we can achieve M
M+1
secure d.o.f., which concludes the achievability part of the theorem.
6 Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages and
M Helpers
In this section, we consider the Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages and
M helpers formulated in Section 2.2. When there are no helpers, i.e., M = 0, due to the
degradedness of the underlying Gaussian broadcast channel, one of the users (stronger) has
the secrecy capacity which is equal to the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel,
and the other user (weaker) has zero secrecy capacity. Therefore, for both users, the secure
d.o.f. is zero, implying that the sum secure d.o.f. of the system is zero. Therefore, we consider
the case M ≥ 1. In this section, we will show that the sum secure d.o.f. is 1 for any M ≥ 1,
as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The sum secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential mes-
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sages and M ≥ 1 helpers is 1 with probability one.
6.1 Converse
An immediate upper bound for the secure d.o.f. of this problem is 1, i.e., Ds,Σ ≤ 1 for any
M . This comes from the fact that the d.o.f. for the Gaussian broadcast channel without any
secrecy constraints is 1, and this constitutes an upper for the sum secure d.o.f. also.
6.2 Achievable Scheme
In the following, we will show that a sum secure d.o.f. of 1 can be achieved for the case of
M = 1. Since the achievable scheme with a single helper achieves the upper bound Ds,Σ ≤ 1,
the sum secure d.o.f. for all M ≥ 1 is 1. Therefore, if we have more than one helper, then
all but one helper may remain silent.
We use the equivalent channel expression in (78) and (79). Let V1, V2 and U be three
mutually independent random variables which are identically and uniformly distributed over
the constellation C(a,Q), where a and Q will be specified later. We assign channel inputs
as X¯1 = V1 +
β
α
V2 and X¯2 = U . Then, the observations at the two receivers are:
Y1 = αV1 + β(V2 + U) +N1 (129)
Y2 = (V1 + U) +
β
α
V2 +N2 (130)
We use two independent variables V1 and V2 to carry the messages W1 andW2 that go to the
two receivers. In order to ensure that the messages are kept secure against the unintended
receiver, we align the cooperative noise signal U from the helper in the dimension of V2 at
receiver 1, and in the dimension of V1 at receiver 2. This is illustrated in Figure 9.
Since X¯2 is an i.i.d. sequence, the following secrecy rate pair is achievable [4, Theorem 4]
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2) (131)
R2 ≥ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Y1|V1) (132)
By using Khintchine-Groshev theorem, it is easy to verify that receiver i can decode Vi,
for i = 1, 2 with arbitrarily small probability of decoding error with probability one, i.e., for
any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ such that the minimum distance dmin between points
at receiver i is,
dmin ≥
kδa
(2Q)1+δ
(133)
for almost all rationally independent {α, β}, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Then,
we can upper bound the probability of decoding error for such a PAM scheme by considering
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Figure 9: Illustration of interference alignment for the Gaussian broadcast channel with
confidential messages and one helper.
the additive Gaussian noise at receiver i as,
Pr
[
Vi 6= Vˆi
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8(2Q)2(1+δ)
)
(134)
where Vˆi is the estimate for Vi by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on
observation Yi. For any δ > 0, if Q = P
1−δ
2(2+δ) , a = γP
1
2/Q, and γ is a positive constant
satisfying
γ ≤ min

|g1|
[
1 +
(
β
α
)2]−1/2
, |g2|

 (135)
then
Pr
[
Vi 6= Vˆi
]
≤ exp
(
−
4k2δγ
2P
8(2Q)2(2+δ)
)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+5
)
(136)
and we can have Pr
[
Vi 6= Vˆi
]
→ 0 as P → ∞. By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain
Vi → Yi → Vˆi, we know that
H(Vi|Yi) ≤ H(Vi|Vˆi) (137)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+5
)
log(2Q+ 1) (138)
which means that
I(Vi; Yi) = H(Vi)−H(Vi|Yi) (139)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+5
)]
log(2Q+ 1)− 1 (140)
=
1− δ
2 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (141)
for i = 1 or 2.
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On the other hand, for i = 1, we have
I(V1; Y2|V2) ≤ I
(
V1;V1 + U +
β
α
V2
∣∣∣V2
)
(142)
= H(V1 + U)−H(U) (143)
≤ 1 (144)
Similarly, for i = 2, we have
I(V2; Y1|V1) ≤ I
(
V2;αV1 + β(V2 + U)
∣∣∣V1) (145)
= H(V2 + U)−H(U) (146)
≤ 1 (147)
which implies that the following sum secrecy rate is achievable
R1 +R2 ≥
2− 2δ
2 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (148)
If we choose δ small enough, then we can have Ds,Σ ≥ 1. Combining this with the upper
bound Ds,Σ ≤ 1, we conclude that
Ds,Σ = 1 (149)
with probability one.
7 Two-User Interference Channel with Confidential Mes-
sages and No Helpers
In this section, we consider the two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential
messages formulated in Section 2.3 for the case of no helpers, i.e., M = 0. The case of
M ≥ 1 will be presented in Section 8. For the case of no helpers, we show that the sum
secure d.o.f. is 2
3
as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 The sum secure d.o.f. of the two-user Gaussian interference channel with con-
fidential messages is 2
3
with probability one.
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7.1 Converse
We first start with (32) of Lemma 1 to upper bound the individual rate R1 of message W1
nR1 ≤ h(X˜1) + h(X˜2)− h(Y2) + nc (150)
≤ h(X˜1) + h(Y1)−H(W1)− h(Y2) + nc11 (151)
≤ h(Y2)−H(W2) + h(Y1)−H(W1)− h(Y2) + nc12 (152)
where (151) is due to applying Lemma 2 for h(X˜2) and (152) is due to applying Lemma 2
once again for h(X˜1). By noting that H(W1) = nR1 and H(W2) = nR2, from (152), we have
2nR1 + nR2 ≤ h(Y1) + nc12 (153)
We use the same method to get a symmetric upper bound on the individual rate R2 of
message W2 as
nR1 + 2nR2 ≤ h(Y2) + nc13 (154)
Then, combining (153) and (154), we get
3(nR1 + nR2) ≤ h(Y1) + h(Y2) + nc14 (155)
≤ 2
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc15 (156)
which means
Ds,Σ ≤
2
3
(157)
which concludes the converse part of the theorem.
7.2 Achievable Scheme
Let {V1, U1, V2, U2} be mutually independent discrete random variables. Each of them is
uniformly and independently drawn from the same constellation C(a,Q), where a and Q
will be specified later. Here, the role of Vi is to carry message Wi, and the role of Ui is the
cooperative jamming signal to help the transmitter-receiver pair j 6= i. We choose the input
signals of the transmitters as:
X1 = V1 +
h2,1
h1,1
U1 (158)
X2 = V2 +
h1,2
h2,2
U2 (159)
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With these input signal selections, observations of the receivers are
Y1 = h1,1V1 + h2,1
(
U1 + V2
)
+
h2,1h1,2
h2,2
U2 +N1 (160)
Y2 = h2,2V2 + h1,2
(
U2 + V1
)
+
h2,1h1,2
h1,1
U1 +N2 (161)
Since, for each i and j 6= i, Vi and Ui are not in the same dimension at both receivers, we
align Ui in the dimension of Vj at receiver i such that Vj is secure and Vi can occupy a larger
space. This is illustrated in Figure 10.
By [4, Theorem 2], we know that the following secrecy rate pair is achievable
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2) (162)
R2 ≥ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Y1|V1) (163)
For receiver 1, by using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in
number theory, we can bound the minimum distance dmin between points in the receiver’s
space, i.e., for any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ such that
dmin ≥
kδa
(2Q)2+δ
(164)
for almost all rationally independent
{
h1,1, h2,1,
h2,1h1,2
h2,2
}
, except for a set of Lebesgue measure
zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM scheme
by considering the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1 as,
Pr
[
V1 6= Vˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8(2Q)2(2+δ)
)
(165)
where Vˆ1 is the estimate of V1 by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on
observation Y1. For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(3+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where
γ < min
i
1√
1 +
(
hj,i
hi,i
)2 (166)
is a constant independent of P to normalize the average power of the input signals. Then,
Pr
[
V1 6= Vˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
k2δγ
24P
8(2Q)2(2+δ)+2
)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+7
)
(167)
and we can have Pr
[
V1 6= Vˆ1
]
→ 0 as P →∞.
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Figure 10: Illustration of interference alignment for the two-user Gaussian interference chan-
nel with confidential messages (no helpers).
To lower bound the achievable rate R1, we first note that
I(V1; Y1) ≥ I(V1; Vˆ1) (168)
= H(V1)−H(V1|Vˆ1) (169)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+7
)]
log(2Q+ 1)− 1 (170)
=
1− δ
3 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (171)
On the other hand,
I(V1; Y2|V2) ≤ I(V1; Y2, U1|V2) (172)
= I(V1; Y2|V2, U1) (173)
≤ I (V1; h1,2(U2 + V1)|V2, U1) (174)
= H(U2 + V1)−H(U2) (175)
≤ log(4Q+ 1)− log(2Q+ 1) (176)
≤ 1 (177)
Combining (171) and (177), we obtain
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2) (178)
≥
1− δ
3 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (179)
By applying this same analysis to rate R2, we can obtain a symmetric result for R2. Then,
by choosing δ arbitrarily small, we can achieve 2
3
sum secure d.o.f.
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8 Two-User Interference Channel with Confidential Mes-
sages and M Helpers
In this section, we consider the two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential
messages formulated in Section 2.3 for the general case of M ≥ 1 helpers. For this general
case, we show that the sum secure d.o.f. is 1 as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 The sum secure d.o.f. of the two-user Gaussian interference channel with con-
fidential messages and M ≥ 1 helpers is 1 with probability one.
8.1 Converse
An immediate upper bound for the secure d.o.f. of this problem is 1, i.e., Ds,Σ ≤ 1 for any
M . This comes from the fact that the d.o.f. for the two-user interference channel without
any secrecy constraints is 1, and this constitutes an upper for the sum secure d.o.f. also.
The fact that the d.o.f. of the two-user interference channel is 1 was first proved in [37].
We provide an alternative proof to this fact using the techniques developed in this paper in
Appendix A.
8.2 Achievable Scheme
In the following, we will show that a sum secure d.o.f. of 1 can be achieved for the case of
M = 1. Since the achievable scheme with a single helper achieves the upper bound Ds,Σ ≤ 1,
the sum secure d.o.f. for all M ≥ 1 is 1. Therefore, if we have more than one helpers, then
all but one helper may remain silent.
Let {V1, V2, U} be mutually independent discrete random variables. Each of them is
uniformly and independently drawn from the same constellation C(a,Q), where a and Q
will be specified later. Here, the role of Vi is to carry message Wi, and the role of U is the
cooperative jamming signal from the helper. We choose the input signals of the transmitters
as:
X1 =
h3,2
h1,2
V1 (180)
X2 =
h3,1
h2,1
V2 (181)
X3 = U (182)
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With these input signal selections, observations of the receivers are
Y1 =
h3,2h1,1
h1,2
V1 + h3,1
(
U + V2
)
+N1 (183)
Y2 =
h3,1h2,2
h2,1
V2 + h3,2
(
U + V1
)
+N2 (184)
For each i and j 6= i, we align U in the dimension of Vj at receiver i such that Vj is secure
and Vi can be decoded. This is illustrated in Figure 11.
Since U is an i.i.d. sequence, by [4, Theorem 2], we know that the following secrecy rate
pair is achievable
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2) (185)
R2 ≥ I(V2; Y2)− I(V2; Y1|V1) (186)
For receiver 1, by using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in
number theory, we can bound the minimum distance dmin between the points in receiver’s
space, i.e., for any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ such that
dmin ≥
kδa
(2Q)1+δ
(187)
for almost all rationally independent
{
h3,2h1,1
h1,2
, h3,1
}
, except for a set of Lebesgue measure
zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM scheme
by considering the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1 as,
Pr
[
V1 6= Vˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8(2Q)2(1+δ)
)
(188)
where Vˆ1 is the estimate of V1 by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on the
observation Y1. For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(2+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where
γ < min
(∣∣∣∣h3,2h1,2
∣∣∣∣
−1
,
∣∣∣∣h3,1h2,1
∣∣∣∣
−1
, 1
)
(189)
is a constant independent of P to normalize the average power of the input signals. Then,
Pr
[
V1 6= Vˆ1
]
≤ exp
(
−
k2δγ
24P
8(2Q)2(1+δ)+2
)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+5
)
(190)
and we can have Pr
[
V1 6= Vˆ1
]
→ 0 as P →∞.
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Figure 11: Illustration of interference alignment for the two-user Gaussian interference chan-
nel with confidential messages and one helper.
To lower bound the achievable rate R1, we first note that
I(V1; Y1) ≥ I(V1; Vˆ1) (191)
= H(V1)−H(V1|Vˆ1) (192)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2P δ
22δ+5
)]
log(2Q+ 1)− 1 (193)
=
1− δ
2 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (194)
On the other hand,
I(V1; Y2|V2) ≤ I
(
V1; h3,2(U + V1)|V2
)
(195)
= H(U + V1)−H(U) (196)
≤ log(4Q+ 1)− log(2Q+ 1) (197)
≤ 1 (198)
Combining (194) and (198), we obtain
R1 ≥ I(V1; Y1)− I(V1; Y2|V2) (199)
≥
1− δ
2 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (200)
By applying this same analysis to rate R2, we can obtain a symmetric result for R2. Then,
by choosing δ arbitrarily small, we can achieve 1 sum secure d.o.f. with probability one for
almost all channel gains for the M = 1 case.
33
9 K-User Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
In this section, we consider the K-user multiple access wiretap channel formulated in Sec-
tion 2.4. We show that the sum secure d.o.f. of this channel is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
as stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 6 The sum secure d.o.f. of the K-user Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel
is K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
with probability one.
9.1 Converse
We start with the sum rate and derive an upper bound similar to Lemma 1
n
K∑
i=1
Ri =
K∑
i=1
H(Wi) = H(W
K
1 ) (201)
≤ I(WK1 ;Y1,Y2)− I(W
K
1 ;Y2) + nc15 (202)
= I(WK1 ;Y1|Y2) + nc15 (203)
≤ I(XK1 ;Y1|Y2) + nc15 (204)
= h(Y1|Y2)− h(Y1|Y2,X
K
1 ) + nc15 (205)
= h(Y1|Y2)− h(N1|Y2,X
K
1 ) + nc15 (206)
≤ h(Y1|Y2) + nc16 (207)
= h(Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc17 (208)
= h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K ,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K |Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc17 (209)
where WK1
△
= {Wj}
K
j=1 and, for each j, X˜j = Xj + N˜j. Here N˜j is an i.i.d. sequence and
N˜j is a Gaussian noise with variance σ
2
j < min(1/h
2
j , 1/g
2
j ). Also, {N˜j}
K
j=1 are mutually
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independent, and are independent of all other random variables. Thus,
n
K∑
i=1
Ri = h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K ,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K |Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc17 (210)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K ,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K|Y1,Y2,X1,X2, · · · ,XK)
− h(Y2) + nc17 (211)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K ,Y1,Y2)− h(N˜1, N˜2, · · · , N˜K|Y1,Y2,X1,X2, · · · ,XK)
− h(Y2) + nc17 (212)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K ,Y1,Y2)− h(Y2) + nc18 (213)
= h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K) + h(Y1,Y2|X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K)− h(Y2) + nc18 (214)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜K)− h(Y2) + nc19 (215)
=
K∑
j=1
h(X˜j)− h(Y2) + nc20 (216)
≤
K∑
j=2
h(X˜j) + nc21 (217)
where (215) follows similar to (53), and (217) is due to
h(X˜1) ≤ h(g1X1 +N2) + nc22 ≤ h(Y2) + nc22 (218)
which is similar to going from (32) to (33) in Lemma 1 by using derivations in (60)-(65).
On the other hand, for each j, we have a bound similar to Lemma 2
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi) = H(W6=j) (219)
≤ I(W6=j;Y1) + nc23 (220)
≤ I
(∑
i 6=j
hiXi;Y1
)
+ nc23 (221)
= h (Y1)− h
(
Y1
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i 6=j
hiXi
)
+ nc23 (222)
= h (Y1)− h (hjXj +N1) + nc23 (223)
≤ h(Y1)− h(X˜j) + nc24 (224)
where W6=j
△
= {Wi}
K
i=1\{Wj} which forms the Markov chain W6=j → X 6=j →
∑
i 6=j hiXi →
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Y1. Therefore, for each j, we have
h(X˜j) ≤ h(Y1)−
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi) + nc24 (225)
Now, continuing from (217) and incorporating (225), we have
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤
K∑
j=2
h(X˜j) + nc25 (226)
≤
K∑
j=2
[
h(Y1)−
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi)
]
+ nc26 (227)
Noting that H(Wi) = nRi, this is equivalent to,
nR1 + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1
nRj ≤ (K − 1)h(Y1) + nc26 (228)
We then apply this upper bound for each i by eliminating a different h(X˜i) each time in
the same way that it was done for h(X˜1) in (218) and have K upper bounds in total:
nRi + (K − 1)
K∑
j=1
nRj ≤ (K − 1)h(Y1) + nc26, i = 1, 2, · · · , K (229)
Thus,
[
K(K − 1) + 1
] K∑
j=1
nRj ≤ K(K − 1)h(Y1) + nc27 (230)
≤ K(K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc28 (231)
that is,
Ds,Σ ≤
K(K − 1)
K(K − 1) + 1
(232)
which concludes the converse part of the theorem.
9.2 Achievable Scheme
In the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers, our achievability scheme divided the mes-
sage signal intoM parts, and each one of theM helpers protected a part at the eavesdropper.
On the other hand, in the interference channel with confidential messages, since each user had
its own message to send, each transmitter sent a combination of a message and a cooperative
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jamming signal. We combine these two approaches to propose the following achievability
scheme in this K-user multiple access wiretap channel. Each transmitter i divides its mes-
sage into (K − 1) mutually independent sub-signals. In addition, each transmitter i sends
a cooperative jamming signal Ui. At the eavesdropper Y2, each sub-signal indexed by (i, j),
where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}\{i}, is aligned with a cooperative jamming signal Ui. At the legiti-
mate receiver Y1, all of the cooperative jamming signals are aligned in the same dimension
to occupy as small a signal space as possible. This scheme is illustrated in Figure 12 for the
case of K = 3.
We use in total K2 mutually independent random variables which are
Vi,j , i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, j 6= i (233)
Uk, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K} (234)
Each of them is uniformly and independently drawn from the same constellation C(a,Q),
where a and Q will be specified later. For each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, we choose the input signal
of transmitter i as
Xi =
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj
gihj
Vi,j +
1
hi
Ui (235)
With these input signal selections, observations of the receivers are
Y1 =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gjhi
gihj
Vi,j +
[
K∑
k=1
Uk
]
+N1 (236)
Y2 =
[
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
gj
hj
Vi,j
]
+
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
Uj +N2 (237)
=
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
[
Uj +
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vi,j
]
+N2 (238)
By [29, Theorem 1], we can achieve the following sum secrecy rate
sup
K∑
i=1
Ri ≥ I(V; Y1)− I(V; Y2) (239)
where V
△
= {Vi,j : i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, j 6= i}.
Now, we first bound the probability of decoding error. Note that the space observed at
receiver 1 consists of (2Q+ 1)K(K−1)(2KQ+1) points in K(K − 1) + 1 dimensions, and the
sub-signal in each dimension is drawn from a constellation of C(a,KQ). Here, we use the
property that C(a,Q) ⊂ C(a,KQ). By using Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine
approximation in number theory, we can bound the minimum distance dmin between the
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Figure 12: Illustration of interference alignment for the K-user multiple access wiretap
channel. Here, K = 3.
points in the receiver’s space, i.e., for any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ such that
dmin ≥
kδa
(KQ)K(K−1)+δ
(240)
for almost all rationally independent factors in the Y1 except for a set of Lebesgue measure
zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding error of such a PAM scheme
by considering the additive Gaussian noise at receiver 1 as,
Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8
)
≤ exp
(
−
a2k2δ
8(KQ)2(K(K−1)+δ)
)
(241)
where Vˆ is the estimate of V by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on
observation Y1. For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(K(K−1)+1+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where γ is
a constant independent of P , then
Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
≤ exp
(
−
k2δγ
2K2P
8(KQ)2(K(K−1)+δ)+2
)
= exp
(
−
k2δγ
2K2P δ
8K2(K(K−1)+δ)
)
(242)
and we can have Pr
[
V 6= Vˆ
]
→ 0 as P → ∞. To satisfy the power constraint at the
transmitters, we can simply choose
γ ≤ min
i
1√∑K
j=1,j 6=i
(
gj
gihj
)2
+
(
1
hi
)2 (243)
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By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V→ Y1 → Vˆ, we know that
H(V|Y1) ≤ H(V|Vˆ) (244)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−
k2δγ
2K2P δ
8K2(K(K−1)+1+δ)
)
log(2Q+ 1)K(K−1) (245)
which means that
I(V; Y1) = H(V)−H(V|Y1) (246)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2K2P δ
8K2(K(K−1)+1+δ)
)]
log(2Q+ 1)K(K−1) − 1 (247)
On the other hand,
I(V; Y2) ≤ I
(
V;
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
[
Uj +
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vi,j
])
(248)
= H
(
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
[
Uj +
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vi,j
])
−H
(
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
[
Uj +
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vi,j
] ∣∣∣∣∣V
)
(249)
= H
(
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
[
Uj +
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Vi,j
])
−H
(
K∑
j=1
gj
hj
Uj
)
(250)
≤ K log
2KQ + 1
2Q+ 1
(251)
≤ K logK (252)
where (250) is due to the fact that entropy is maximized by the uniform distribution which
takes values over a set of cardinality (2KQ + 1)K .
Combining (247) and (252), we obtain
sup
K∑
i=1
Ri ≥ I(V; Y1)− I(V; Y2) (253)
≥
[
1− exp
(
−
k2δγ
2K2P δ
8K2(K(K−1)+1+δ)
)]
log(2Q+ 1)K(K−1) − 1−K logK (254)
=
K(K − 1)(1− δ)
K(K − 1) + 1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (255)
where o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily small, then we can achieve
K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
sum secure d.o.f. with probability one.
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10 Conclusion
We determined the secure d.o.f. of several fundamental channel models in one-hop wireless
networks. We first considered the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper. While the
helper needs to create interference at the eavesdropper, it should not create too much in-
terference at the legitimate receiver. Our approach is based on understanding this trade-off
that the helper needs to strike. To that purpose, we developed an upper bound that relates
the entropy of the cooperative jamming signal from the helper and the message rate. In
addition, we developed an achievable scheme based on real interference alignment which
aligns the cooperative jamming signal from the helper in the same dimension as the message
signal. This ensures that the information leakage rate is upper bounded by a constant which
does not scale with the power. In addition, to help the legitimate user decode the message,
our achievable scheme renders the message signal and the cooperative jamming signal dis-
tinguishable at the legitimate receiver. This essentially implies that the message signal can
occupy only half of the available space in terms of the degrees of freedom. Consequently, we
showed that the exact secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper is 1
2
by
these matching achieavibility and converse proofs. We then generalized our achievability and
converse techniques to the Gaussian wiretap channel with M helpers, Gaussian broadcast
channel with confidential messages and helpers, two-user Gaussian interference channel with
confidential messages and helpers, and K-user Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel. In
the multiple-message settings, transmitters needed to send a mix of their own messages and
cooperative jamming signals. We determined the exact secure d.o.f. in all of these system
models.
A An Alternative Proof for the Multiplexing Gain of
the K-User Gaussian Interference Channel
The original proof for this setting is given by [37]. Here, we provide an alternative proof for
the K = 2 case by using Lemma 2, and then extend it to the case of general K.
For K = 2, the channel model for the two-user Gaussian interference channel is
Y1 = h1,1X1 + h2,1X2 +N1 (256)
Y2 = h1,2X1 + h2,2X2 +N2 (257)
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We start with the definition of the sum rate
nR1 + nR2 = H(W1,W2) (258)
= H(W1,W2|Y1,Y2) + I(W1,W2;Y1,Y2) (259)
≤ I(W1,W2;Y1,Y2) + nc29 (260)
= h(Y1,Y2)− h(Y1,Y2|W1,W2) + nc29 (261)
≤ h(Y1,Y2)− h(Y1,Y2|X1,X2,W1,W2) + nc29 (262)
≤ h(Y1,Y2) + nc30 (263)
= h(X˜1, X˜2,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2|Y1,Y2) + nc30 (264)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2,Y1,Y2)− h(X˜1, X˜2|Y1,Y2,X1,X2) + nc30 (265)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2,Y1,Y2) + nc31 (266)
= h(X˜1, X˜2) + h(Y1,Y2|X˜1, X˜2) + nc31 (267)
≤ h(X˜1, X˜2) + nc32 (268)
where the last inequality follows similar to (53) after a derivation similar to (55)-(59), and,
for each j, X˜j = Xj+N˜j. Here N˜j is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜j, which is Gaussian with variance
σ2j < min(1/h
2
j,1, 1/h
2
j,2). Also, {N˜j}
K
j=1 are mutually independent, and are independent of
all other random variables.
Then, we apply Lemma 2 to characterize the interference from X1 to transmitter-receiver
pair 2 and from X2 to transmitter-receiver pair 1
nR1 + nR2 ≤ h(X˜1, X˜2) + nc32 (269)
≤ h(X˜1) + h(X˜2) + nc32 (270)
≤ h(Y2)−H(W2) + h(Y1)−H(W1) + nc33 (271)
By noting that H(W1) = nR1 and H(W2) = nR2, we have
2(nR1 + nR2) ≤ h(Y2) + h(Y1) + nc33 (272)
≤ 2
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc34 (273)
which implies that
DΣ
△
= lim
P→∞
sup
R1 +R2
1
2
logP
≤ 1 (274)
i.e., the multiplexing gain of the two-user Gaussian interference channel is not greater than
1. By the argument in [37, Proposition 1], we can conclude that the multiplexing gain of the
K-user Gaussian interference channel is at most K
2
.
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